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GE 2015 and the Malay Community: Voting Trends and Issues 
This article attempts to analyse the reasons for the Malay community’s seeming support for the 
People’s Action Party (PAP) government in Singapore, in spite of online discontentment that was 
expressed towards the party, just prior to the elections. The article makes three main arguments: 
1) the reasons explaining the community’s support for PAP are similar to other Singaporeans, 
such as the death of founding leader Lee Kuan Yew and the risk-averse nature of the electorate; 
2) institutional impediments exist with regards to the community, that heavily favour the 
government; and 3) the main opposition party, Workers’ Party (WP), has not been able to be a 
viable alternative to PAP for the community, both in terms of quality of candidates and ideas. 
 
Introduction  
After the 2011 General Elections (GE) in Singapore which witnessed dramatic shift in 
popular support towards the opposition, it was expected that the 2015 GE would see closer 
electoral battles, which would then magnify the importance of the minority communities. The 
Malay community, comprising of 15% of the population,1 could have been a potentially crucial 
voting bloc in the case of such contests. However, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government 
marched to an unexpectedly resounding victory. In the aftermath of the results, the ruling party’s 
Minister in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, promptly declared that PAP’s triumph 
amply demonstrated that the Malay/Muslim community supports the government since it has 
benefitted tremendously from 50 years of PAP rule.2 While it is difficult to fully ascertain the 
veracity of the claim considering the absence of explicit data on voting by the different ethnic 
groups, it would be reasonable to assume that PAP’s claim is largely true: in the 10 Group 
Representation Constituencies where a Malay candidate is required to be fielded, and therefore in 
which there are significant Malay populations, PAP attained about 68% of the valid votes.3 This 
is similar to the national percentage of 70% of the vote share for PAP, indicating that the Malay 
voting pattern was similar to that of the other races’.  
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 This article attempts to analyse the issues pertaining to the Malay community, and to 
explain the plausible reasons for the support that the community seemingly provided to PAP. I put 
forth several arguments: firstly, the reasons for the Malay community’s support for the government 
are similar to the other ethnic communities; secondly, in spite of a marked improvement in the 
quality of some of the opposition Malay candidates, there are institutional impediments that limit 
their ability to defeat PAP candidates; and finally, the main opposition party, the Workers’ Party 
(WP), has failed to provide a viable alternative for the Malay community, both in terms of 
candidates and plans. 
Malays in Singapore: A Brief Look 
 The Malay community is the largest ethnic minority group in Singapore. Apart from 
comprising a substantial portion of the voting bloc, the Malays are constitutionally recognized as 
the indigenous inhabitants of the land.4 The importance of managing the Malay community from 
the state’s perspective is exacerbated by the fact that Singapore is surrounded by larger Malay 
countries, whom have at times been antagonistic towards the city-state (Huxley 1991). The Malays 
are overwhelmingly Muslim, and hence when the state deals with the Malays, they are in fact 
dealing with Islam, and vice-versa. It has been argued that “Malay” and “Muslim” or “Islam” are 
so intertwined that they are often conflated in the context of Singapore politics (Kadir 2004).  Since 
independence, Malays have not fared as well the other races in socio-economic terms. Whether 
the position of the Malays are due to institutional or cultural factors (or both) is the point of 
contention in this essay; I just wish to highlight that the Malays’ socio-economic standing is 
viewed as a huge problem for the state as it could be a potent source of discontentment, if not 
managed carefully. There has also been a resurgence in Islamic consciousness amongst the Malays 
in Singapore: Islam is becoming more and more central to the lives of many Malays and while in 
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general, this manifests itself in mundane terms, there have been cases of “self-radicalized” 
Muslims or those who join terrorist organizations. The competitive authoritarian state of Singapore 
seeks to manage religion in general, and the Malays/Muslims specifically, in various ways: both 
legal, draconian measures and softer tactics such as co-optation of religious organizations, so as to 
mitigate this rise in religious fervour (Abdullah 2013). There is a Minister of Muslim Affairs in 
the cabinet, who acts as the bridge between the community and the government, and before the 
2011 GE, there had been not a single opposition Malay/Muslim parliamentarian. 
These are the contextual factors that need to be taken into account before embarking on any socio-
political analyses of the Malay community. 
Explaining Malay Support for PAP  
 Prior to the GE, it was difficult to gauge the level of Malay support for the government. 
On one hand, the state-controlled Malay daily, Berita Harian, which is the only Malay newspaper 
in the country, covered the PAP Malay candidates to a severely disproportionate extent, ignoring 
many of their opposition counterparts. On the other, social media was rife with many complaints 
and comments about the government’s alleged mistreatment of Malays and Islam. Perhaps the 
most prominent issue that was discussed online was the hijab issue: there was an online petition 
asking for the government to reverse its ban on the hijab for public school uniforms, hospitals 
(nurses) and the uniformed services.  
Yet, the GE results evidently showed that online discontentment was not reflective of the 
general sentiment amongst Singaporeans and the Malay community. I posit several arguments for 
this: firstly, the risk-averse nature of Singaporean voters, including Malays; secondly, the effects 
of Lee Kuan Yew’s death on voters; thirdly, the ‘carrots’ offered by PAP; fourthly, the near-total 
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domination of the key Malay/Muslim institutions by the ruling party; and finally, the failure of WP 
to appeal to the Malays. 
Risk-Averse Nature of Singaporeans and Malays 
 What is referred to here by ‘risk aversion’ is in political terms: I contend that Singaporeans 
in general, prefer PAP to be in power. While many do wish to see oppositional presence in 
Parliament, they do not desire PAP’s demise. Even in terms of opposition parties, Singaporeans 
have displayed a clear unwillingness for a radical departure from PAP: the fact that WP is the best 
performing opposition party in both GE 2011 and GE 2015, and not SDP, demonstrates the 
electorate’s conservativeness and their inclination towards something familiar. WP is a party 
which is similar to PAP, whereas SDP propagates a left-leaning ideology, with a heavy focus on 
political and individual freedoms, and substantially differs from both PAP and WP (Da Cunha 
2012).  
GE 2011 was the election wherein the incumbent performed the worst in its history, since 
independence. The opposition managed to snatch a hitherto formidable Group Representation 
Constituency (GRC) from PAP, and attained 40% of the popular vote. Evidently, the psychological 
barrier of winning a GRC was broached by the opposition; and perhaps, this had an adverse effect 
with regards to opposition chances of making more gains in 2015, on the voters. Hence, when both 
WP and SDP were perceived to be doing extremely well during the hustings, as adjudged by the 
huge turnouts at their rallies, the thought of a ‘freak election’ – whereby PAP would lose power 
despite the people wanting them to be the government, as voters became complacent and chose 
opposition candidates for more representation instead – became heightened, even though the 
likelihood of it happening was in fact negligibly low. WP built on its 2011 success and fielded 
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many candidates of high quality, including Associate Professor Daniel Goh, a sociologist from 
National University of Singapore (NUS). But what was more surprising was SDP, led by the 
enigmatic Dr Chee Soon Juan, a long-time opponent of PAP who had been bankrupted after 
lawsuits by senior PAP leaders. He managed to transform his reputation from a political rebel to 
serious contender. What was perhaps even more impressive was the party’s new candidate, 
Professor Anand Tambyah, a medical doctor, who articulated well-thought out plans for healthcare 
reforms. Middle-ground voters (voters who are neither staunch supporters nor opponents of the 
government) were then possibly repulsed by the possibility of a freak election and turned to PAP. 
The possibility of a ‘freak election’ had been mooted by many government-linked individuals, 
including Minister for National Development, Khaw Boon Wan.5 Since 2011 had proved that the 
opposition was indeed capable of winning a GRC, the idea of a freak election suddenly became 
plausible to many voters, like it had never been before. For the Malay community, the notion that 
the Malays had “progressed” and benefitted tremendously from PAP rule was the theme of the 
hustings. Dr Yaacob urged the Malays to vote in a “wise and rational” manner in order for their 
futures to be secure, implying a tenuous future ahead if the opposition was in charge.6 Minister in 
Prime Minister’s Office, Masagos Zulkifli, had stated that the Malay MPs were “vanguards” for 
the Muslim community;7 emphasising the importance of the quality of the candidates in 
determining not just the socio-economic well-being of the community, but also, in protecting the 
religious-cultural elements. Just like the other communities, the concept of a ‘freak election’ was 
real to the Malays; the possibility of them losing the leadership that had brought much socio-
economic gains and had hitherto been the protectors of their ethno-religious rights could have 
swayed the middle-ground voters towards PAP.  
Lee Kuan Yew’s Death: A Nostalgic Reminder of PAP’s Achievements 
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It would be no exaggeration to suggest that the death of Singapore’s founding Prime Minister, Lee 
Kuan Yew, in March 2015 had a profound effect on the elections. The outbreak of emotions during 
Lee’s funeral, which was described as a national tragedy, was unprecedented in city-state’s history. 
Undoubtedly, the state-controlled media played a huge part in aggrandizing the week-long event, 
but to state that the hype was all due to the media would be unfair to Singaporeans. Ordinary 
citizens from all walks of life and across the political spectrum turned up in droves to pay their last 
respects to the statesman. Many Malays were seen crying at his funeral, as were the other 
Singaporeans. It was not uncommon to hear Malays exhorting Lee’s achievements for the 
community, how he was fluent in Malay and how he always cared for them.8 Undoubtedly, there 
were some Singaporeans who were ambivalent, and even celebratory, about his death, but they 
were by far in the minority. It was abundantly plain that the nation truly mourned with his passing. 
That the GE was held a few months after his death, likely contributed to PAP’s resounding victory. 
The two above-mentioned factors, are not unique to the Malay/Muslim community: they can be 
used to explain the national swing in support as well. The following factors, however, are perhaps 
more specific to the Malay community. 
‘Carrots’ for Malays 
A strategy commonly employed by PAP nearing every GE is the distribution of ‘carrots’, usually 
involving, but not restricted to, financial and material incentives. This GE was no different: the 
most significant of the carrots was the Pioneer Generation Package, a subsidized healthcare plan 
that cost about 9 billion dollars, and that is estimated to benefit 450 000 citizens. The scheme was 
introduced in 2014 to honour the pioneers of Singapore for their efforts in building the country to 
what it is today.9  
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There were several other initiatives, put in place after the 2011 GE, which directly targeted the 
Malay community. In 2012, the Tertiary Tuition Fee Scheme (TTFS) was expanded to allow more 
Malay students to qualify: while previously eligibility for TTFS depended on total household 
income, now it was based on household income per capita.10 The following year, the government 
extended its Edusave scheme (funds for extra-curricular activities) to Madrasah (Islamic schools) 
students.11 These two developments are noteworthy as both issues had been raised by the 
community, as noted by PM Lee himself, for many years, but it was only after 2011 that they were 
implemented.12 At the National Day Rally in 2014, Lee announced that a new mosque would be 
built and named after the first President of the country, Yusof Ishak, and likewise, the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies would be re-named after him.13 Just before GE 2015, Lee stated that 
madrasahs would be receiving increased financial support from the government in its teaching of 
secular subjects.14 In another ‘first’ for the community, PAP appointed two sitting Malay/Muslim 
ministers in one cabinet for the first time since independence, with Masagos’ promotion to a full 
Minister in April 2015.15  
PAP displayed a vigour in their efforts to court Malay votes, via these carrots, to the extent of 
altering long-held policies. This stratagem evidently reflected the government’s thinking that 
Malay votes could have been potentially decisive, in fiercely-contested electoral battles.  
Near-total control over Malay/Muslim Institutions 
 It is true that PAP retains dominance over many institutions throughout the country: the 
party’s preponderance can to a large extent be explained by its control of institutions including the 
trade unions, grassroots organizations, mass media, bureaucracy, and the legislature. However, for 
the Malay/Muslim community, there is an added layer of authority. There are three organizations 
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that are crucial to the community: the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), Council 
for the Development of Singapore Malay/Muslim Community (Mendaki), and the aforementioned 
Berita Harian. These organizations, I argue, serve to perpetuate the ruling party’s dominance over 
the Malay/Muslim community. 
MUIS is undoubtedly the most important Islamic organization in Singapore. The position of MUIS 
as the pre-eminent Muslim organization in the land is guaranteed by the constitution of Singapore 
(K. Y. Tan 2015, 155). MUIS has jurisdiction over many matters pertaining to the Islamic faith. 
The Mufti, the highest Islamic authority who issues religious edicts, is part of the organization. 
Apart from being the definitive authority over jurisprudential matters, MUIS also has significant 
influence over numerous administrative issues, such as the provision of hajj services, the 
distribution of halal (Islamically permissible) certificates for food and beverage companies and 
stall owners, the administration of waqf (religious endowment) properties, and many more. Three 
of the six full-time madrasahs (Islamic religious schools) are under the direct purview of MUIS.16  
Each Friday, mosques in Singapore would normally utilize the sermon written by MUIS in their 
delivery of the sermons during Friday prayers, which are attended by a substantial portion of the 
male Muslim population. It is difficult to imagine an aspect of the Muslim life in Singapore that is 
not directly or indirectly penetrated by MUIS.   
MUIS is an arm of the state, under the Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth (MCCY). As 
per the Constitution, the President of Singapore appoints the President of MUIS and the Mufti, at 
the advice of the Minister of Muslim Affairs. Here we can see the interventionist nature of the state 
in this arrangement. While undoubtedly, there have been occasions where MUIS has disagreed 
openly with the state, it is equally undeniable that the relationship between the two can largely be 
characterized as a compliant one on the part of MUIS. The state, I argue, utilizes MUIS so as to 
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achieve its socio-political objectives. This is not to take the away the agency of the actors within 
MUIS; I argue that MUIS willingly allows itself to be co-opted in order to reap benefits for both 
the organization and the Muslim community as a whole. Whatever the motivations, it is evident 
that the co-optation of MUIS does strengthen the state. After Lee’s death, the Friday sermon 
included praise of the statesman’s legacy, something almost unprecedented in the community’s 
history. The fact that the state has successfully included MUIS into its apparatus has effectively 
sealed the door for sustained religious opposition to any of the state’s policies, at an institutional 
level.17 
Dr Maliki Osman, the Senior Minister of State for National Development and Defence, explicitly 
invoked the success of Muslim religious scholars, the ulama, during one of his election rallies. He 
stated that the country had witnessed a growing number of ulama with solid credentials in recent 
years, and singled out those who had attained doctorate degrees.18 While it is unclear what exactly 
the state had to do with the success of those scholars, it did seem that Maliki was trying to, at least 
indirectly, attribute the educational attainments of the ulama to PAP’s policies. Significantly, none 
of the ulama mentioned responded to Maliki’s comments in public; not even on their own social 
media platforms. While not all of the ulama in the country have been co-opted, it is fair to say that 
the state does not face challenges to its authority from the Islamic clergy, unlike in many other 
countries. The control that the state possesses over the clergy – either through direct appointments 
and co-optation strategies, or informal methods such as creating conditions whereby it is difficult 
for the ulama to defy the state openly – have undoubtedly ensured a smoother path for PAP to 
exert its influence over the Malay community. The ulama are traditionally an important power 
base in any Muslim society (Zaman 2002), and Singapore is no different. It is reasonable to 
presume that if there are ulama who openly disagree or question the state, PAP’s authority would 
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wane at least amongst some segments in the Malay community, especially those that strongly 
adhere to proclamations made by religious elites. This point is strengthened by Masagos’ 
declaration in one of his rally speeches during this campaign. He urged members of the 
community, presumably online critics of PAP who use religion to make the case that PAP is not 
the party that would protect the interests of Islam, to not ‘champion Muslim issues if you are not 
the experts in it’, and that the community must ‘trust the ulama’.19 The message was obvious from 
the Minister: if the ulama, who are custodians of the Islamic faith (Zaman 2002), do not question 
PAP’s credibility, then the masses have no moral or spiritual authority to do so. 
Mendaki is another prominent organization in the Malay community. As self-help group initially 
set up by the government to improve the educational standing of Malays, the organization has 
since acquired greater importance, expanding its focus to include issues pertaining to youth, family 
and employability.20 The chairman of the organization is the Minister of Muslim Affairs, and its 
board members usually include several Malay PAP MPs. Mendaki is responsible for the 
disbursement of educational scholarships, conducting of coaching programs for the unemployed 
and parents. By linking Mendaki to the state, the positives associated with Mendaki are by 
extension, indicative of the state’s ‘benevolence’ to the Malay community: for instance, the 
scholarships are not only perceived to be given via Mendaki, but in fact, by the state. It is therefore 
common for Malay MPs to directly be involved in the handing out of scholarships to students, so 
as to bolster this perception.21 The patently partisan nature of the organization can be seen through 
the exclusion of Faisal Manap, WP’s Malay opposition MP, from Mendaki’s Community Leaders 
Forum (CLF). CLF is supposed to be a platform, under the purview of Mendaki, which gathers 
“Malay Members of Parliament, Malay Members of Parliament, community partners and activists, 
on strategies to enable the community to realise its shared vision for excellence.”22 Interestingly, 
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despite its stated mission, Faisal’s request to join the CLF was turned down by Yaacob, with the 
latter saying that CLF is a “structure created by the community for community partners, not 
political parties.”23 Not only does this deprive the opposition of access to decision-making, 
discussions and even information on community issues, it could also contribute to the perception 
that the opposition parties are not involved in efforts to better the community, even if this is not 
by their own doing.  
As discussed earlier, Berita Harian (BH) is the only newspaper in the Malay language available 
in the country. While the decline of the print media is often mooted, its continued influence in 
Singapore cannot be denied, especially for the Malay community. Many Malays still rely on BH 
as a source of information. The state’s monopoly over the media in Singapore is well-documented; 
George argues that the mass media contributes to PAP’s dominance via both direct and indirect 
means, with the latter being self-censorship on the part of editors and journalists (George 2012). 
The effects of state influence on BH was particularly pronounced during the election period: there 
was somewhat a media “blackout” on the opposition Malay candidates. These candidates, who 
raised many issues that concerned the community, were not given due coverage, and the fact that 
they raised these issues, were not highlighted by BH. As a result, many had to rely on alternative 
media (such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube) to get their messages across. While BH ran an 
article on each of the candidates after they were introduced, they were not subsequently adequately 
covered, and the issues they raised were not discussed. This situation is remarkable, as even the 
other newspapers give more coverage to the Malay candidates.24  
Consider the case of Damanhuri Abas, the SDP candidate. Damanhuri was a known entity amongst 
Malay grassroots organizations, as he had served in many of them for about two decades, including 
Persatuan Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Association). During the rallies, Damanhuri raised 
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several issues that had long been articulated by the Malays; including the ban of the hijab (Islamic 
headscarf for females) in the nursing sector and uniformed groups, and public schools. He captured 
the attention of many Malays, who voiced substantial support for him online. Such was the case 
too for Fahmi Rais from Singaporeans First (SingFirst) and Abdillah Zamzuri from the Singapore 
People’s Party (SPP). The online buzz these candidates raised, especially for Damanhuri, far 
outweighed the meagre publicity BH accorded to them, While the issues they raised were not given 
attention in BH, the newspaper instead published two letters to the editor on September 15, four 
days after the election, arguing that opposition candidates should not have raised the hijab issue 
as that would disrupt the ongoing negotiations between the community and the state, and that 
opposition parties should not “politicize” the matter.25 BH’s choice to publish letters that are in 
support of the state, and that castigate the opposition, in addition to not airing the calls made by 
the opposition to reverse the policy during hustings, is even more astounding considering that an 
online petition for the hijab started a few weeks before the election, garnered over 19 000 
signatories.26  Even the state commissioned Suara Musyarawah (Conversations with the 
Community) Committee, noted that many Malays raised the issue of nurses not being able to don 
the hijab as a point of concern.27 BH’s partial coverage of the issue, and the candidates who raised 
it, is telling. In sharp contrast, PAP Malay candidates were featured daily, with several articles and 
pages devoted to them each day. Bearing in mind that readership of BH is estimated to be around 
226 000 (and 260 000 for the Sunday edition), which is about half of the total Malay population, 
BH thus remains a severe institutional impediment to their chances of seeking to be elected.28 
Failure of WP to Appeal to the Malays 
 Aside from Damanhuri, and to a lesser extent Fahmi Rais and Zamzuri, and WP’s Faisal 
Manap who had the advantage of incumbency in Aljunied GRC and the exposure one prior term 
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in Parliament gave him, it can be argued that none of the Malay opposition candidates stood out, 
or had grassroots credibility with the community.29 However, it was WP that was most affected by 
this failure: the other parties were not really up to par in general, with PAP, and it was WP which 
was expected to pose the fiercest contests. While that was eventually the case, WP’s efforts were 
not to capture more GRCs. In East Coast GRC, where the election battle was expected to be the 
closest, with many pundits predicting that WP might wrest the constituency from PAP, WP 
managed to gain only 39% of the votes. In an area with a substantial Malay minority, the fact that 
PAP’s Malay candidate was clearly more impressive than WP’s likely contributed to the high 
margin of victory. Maliki Osman represented PAP, and apart from his governmental positions, 
Maliki is known to be an eloquent speaker with rather stellar educational achievements (he was an 
Assistant Professor at NUS). Compared to WP’s Fairoz Shariff, who was an unknown quantity in 
the Malay community, and who did not perform too well in the delivery of rally speeches, PAP 
had a clear advantage. This is an all-too familiar scenario for WP: in 1988, in the hotly-fought 
Eunos GRC, the WP team garnered 49.1% of the votes. It consisted of Dr Lee Siew-Choh, a 
veteran opposition politician; Francis Seow, a former Solicitor-General; and Khalid Babu, a 
comedian. Siew-Choh and Seow were extremely strong candidates, and it is judicious to assume 
that had they had a more credible Malay candidate in their slate, they would have defeated the PAP 
team. The inability of the opposition, and particularly WP, to attract outstanding Malay candidates, 
has been a longstanding problem (Tan 2013). 
Apart from the incumbent government Malay MPs, the newer candidates fielded by PAP boasted 
notable credentials too. Two of them, Rahayu Mahzam and Amrin Amin, are successful lawyers; 
Saktiandi Supaat is a renowned economist, while the losing Malay candidate in PAP’s team in 
Aljunied, Shamsul Kamar, was a Head of Department in a local secondary school. In addition, the 
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candidates also had prior grassroots exposure as they were involved in Residents’ Committees and 
Malay/Muslim organizations to increase their visibility; an advantage that only PAP candidates 
could have. Besides Damanhuri of SDP, none of the opposition candidates were more familiar to 
the Malay community than their PAP counterparts.  
It is also noteworthy that while SDP was upfront about its plans for the Malay community, and 
released a policy paper pertaining to it30, WP was more reticent in this regard and did not propose 
a comprehensive plan for the Malays. Until WP can rectify this, and the issue of the caliber of their 
Malay candidates vis-à-vis PAP’s, it is unlikely that it will be able to overcome the latter’s 
dominance of the Malay/Muslim vote. 
Conclusion 
It is evident from the discussion that several institutional obstacles stand in the way of opposition 
parties being able to penetrate PAP’s dominance, especially with regards to the Malay/Muslim 
vote. At the same time, opposition parties, especially WP, have to be honest to themselves and 
conduct some self-introspection; and acknowledge that PAP has been successful in recruiting 
Malay candidates of a much higher caliber. WP also has to bolder in proposing comprehensive 
alternative plans for the Malay community, if it has ambitions of challenging PAP on a more equal 
footing. 
The GE results unquestionably represent an endorsement of PAP policies. While this could mean 
that PAP is in a greater position to enact reform, or democratize through the position of strength 
(Slater 2012), it could also mean that there is no incentive to do things differently. In the same 
vein, it remains to be seen whether the results give the PAP leadership greater confidence to pursue 
reforms in its approach towards the Malay/Muslim community, or status quo will ensue. One 
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suspects the latter is more likely, considering the trajectory of the relationship between the state 
and the community, in the past 50 years. 
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17 No doubt, there may be individuals who disagree with the state’s policies, institutionally, the co-optation of MUIS 
has ensured the state dominance over religious institutions. Furthermore, these individuals are few and far between. 
18 MediaCorp, “Dr Maliki: Kepentingan Melayu/Islam amat dekat di hati PAP (Malay/Muslim interests are close to 
the PAP’s heart),” http://berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapore/dr-maliki-kepentingan/2115292.html. Accessed 
2 October 2015. 
19 MediaCorp, “Masagos: Di S’pura sajalah, kepentingan agama dan budaya selalu dijaga dan diperlihara (Only in 
Singapore are religious and cultural interests preserved and protected,” 
http://berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapore/masagos-di-s-pura-sajalah/2112416.html. Accessed 2 October 
2015. 
20 Yayasan Mendaki, http://www.mendaki.org.sg/. Accessed 2 October 2015. 
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21 At the victory press conference, Dr Yaacob in fact mentioned that he was slated to disburse Mendaki bursaries 
and scholarships the following day.  
22 See Community Leaders Forum, http://www.clfprojects.org.sg/content/our-vision--objectives.aspx. Accessed 28 
September 2015. 
23 Singapore Parliament Reports, Parliament No. 12, Session 1, Vol. 88. 20 October 2011.  
24 Straits Times ran an article with the headline It’s time to trust Malays more.” The paper quoted Damanhuri who 
was making the point that the state displays some level of mistrust towards the Malays. See Walter Sim,”It’s time to 
trust Malays more,” Straits Times, 29 August 2015. 
25 See Forum Page of Berita Harian, 15 September 2015. Abdul Kadir Abdul Rahman, “Menjadikkannya satu isu 
pilihan raya boleh jejas proses huraian (Making it an election issue could affect the process of finding a solution),” 
and Ramdan Sudar, “Harap tidak dipolitikkan (Hope the issue is not politicized).”  
26 See the petition at https://www.change.org/p/the-singapore-government-pm-lee-hsien-loong-hijabs-to-be-
allowed-in-the-singapore-workforce-specifically-in-the-uniformed-occupations-and-front-line-positions. Accessed 
29 September 2015. 
27 Suara Musyawarah (Conversations with the Community) Report,July 2013, p. 18. https://www.change.org/p/the-
singapore-government-pm-lee-hsien-loong-hijabs-to-be-allowed-in-the-singapore-workforce-specifically-in-the-
uniformed-occupations-and-front-line-positions. Accessed 29 September 2015. 
28 Singapore Press Holdings, Annual Report 2013, p.18.  
29 Mohd Nawab Mohd Osman, “Small Steps Towards Democracy in Singapore,” New Mandala, 10 September 2015. 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/09/10/small-steps-towards-democracy-in-singapore/.  
30 Singapore Democratic Party, “A Singapore for all Singaporeans: Addressing the Concerns of the Malay 
Community,” http://yoursdp.org/_ld/0/10_Malays_2.0.aa.pdf. Accessed 2 October 2015. 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt. 2013. “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study 
of MUIS and Pergas.” Asian Survey 53 (6): 1182-1204. 
Da Cunha, Derek. 2012. Breakthrough: Roadmap for Singapore's Political Future. Singapore: 
Straits Times Press; Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore. 
George, Cherian. 2012. Freedom from the press: Journalism and state power in Singapore. 
Singapore: NUS Press. 
Huxley, Tim. 1991. “Singapore and Malaysia: A Precarious Balance?” The Pacific Review 4 (3): 
204-213. 
Kadir, Suzaina. 2004. “Islam, State and Society in Singapore.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 (3): 
357-371. 
Mutalib, Hussin. 2012. Singapore Malays: Being Ethnic Minority and Muslim in a Global City-
State. Abingdon, Oxon; New York : Routledge. 
Slater, Dan. 2012. “Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore.” Journal of 
Democracy 23 (2): 19-33. 
Tan, Charlene. 2008. “(Re) imagining the Muslim identity in Singapore.” Studies in Ethnicity 
and Nationalism 8 (1): 31-49. 
17 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Tan, Kevin YL. 2015. The Constitution of Singapore: A Contextual Analysis. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Tan, Netina. 2013. “Manipulating Electoral Laws in Singapore.” Electoral Studies 32 (4): 632-
643. 
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2002. The Ulama in Contemporary Islam : Custodians of Change . 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
